Several researchers have published a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS, a proposed post-quantum signature scheme for Bitcoin, and are asking the wider community to look for flaws in it. Researcher Mikhail Kudinov announced the first version Thursday in a thread on X, saying the paper reduces SHRINCS’ security to the properties of its underlying hash function.
The analysis, dated Nov. 18, estimates classical security of 121.4 to 122.7 bits for SHRINCS, though those figures rest on assumptions that include three unproven conjectures. Kudinov said the work is not finished. The team is still working on a new analysis of a property called SM-DSPR, whose bound has so far been conjectured, and on tightening a reprogramming step and improving a bound against quantum attackers.
SHRINCS is a hash-based scheme, meaning its security rests on hash functions rather than the elliptic curve math behind today’s Bitcoin signatures. It places two designs under one key: a stateful part built on FXMSS with WOTS+C, and a stateless fallback built on SLH-DSA. Because both use the same hash function, Kudinov said, the proof has to cover both.
Signature size is the main cost. Under the draft proposal, stateful SHRINCS signatures run from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless fallback is 5,777 bytes. Schnorr signatures on Bitcoin today are 64 bytes, and ECDSA signatures typically come in around 71. Signatures take up scarce block space, so larger ones mean fewer transactions per block.
The compact stateful path carries a danger. It relies on one-time keys, and if a wallet accidentally reuses one, an attacker can forge a signature for that address and steal the funds.
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